The Solow Growth Model Revisited. Introducing Keynesian Involuntary Unemployment by Magnani, Riccardo
The Solow Growth Model Revisited. Introducing
Keynesian Involuntary Unemployment
Riccardo Magnani
To cite this version:
Riccardo Magnani. The Solow Growth Model Revisited. Introducing Keynesian Involuntary
Unemployment. 2015. <hal-01203393>
HAL Id: hal-01203393
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01203393
Submitted on 22 Sep 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
The Solow Growth Model Revisited.
Introducing Keynesian Involuntary
Unemployment∗
Riccardo Magnani†
September, 2015
∗This is an updated verson of the paper previously entitled“The Solow Growth Model
with Keynesian Involuntary Unemployment”.
†CEPN - Universite´ de Paris 13 and Sorbonne Paris Cite´, 99 Avenue Jean-Baptiste
Cle´ment, 93430 Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: riccardo.magnani@univ-paris13.fr.
1
Abstract
In this paper we extend the Solow growth model by introducing
a simple mechanism which allows to determine involuntary unem-
ployment explained by the weakness in aggregate demand. In our
base model, we introduce a simple investment function and we find
that an increase in aggregate demand (due to a reduction in the
saving rate or to an increase in public expenditures) stimulates real
GDP and reduces unemployment. Then, we modify the investment
function in order to take into account the crowding-in/crowding-out
effect on investments. This allows us to build a class of models
which are between neoclassical supply-driven models and keynesian
demand-driven models depending on the value of a key parameter
that measures the degree of the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on
investments and which lies between zero (for keynesian models) and
one (for neoclassical models). Estimations on six OECD countries
show that our key parameter lies between 0.6 and 0.8, implying that
the fiscal multiplier is between 1 and 2, which is quite consistent
with the empirical evidence.
JEL Classification: O40; E13; E12; J60.
Key-words: Neoclassical growth model; Keynesian model; Invol-
untary unemployment.
1 Introduction
It is quite surprising that neoclassical growth models have completely ne-
glected a fundamental macroeconomic issue such as unemployment. Unem-
ployment is considered as a short-term phenomenon affecting fluctuations
but not as a long-term issue. In contrast, empirical data show that not
only GDP growth rates but also unemployment rates fluctuate around a
trend and, consequently, would deserve to be taken into account in growth
models. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the unemployment rate for six
OECD countries.
It is further surprising that a macroeconomic shock such as a change in
public expenditures or, more generally, in one of the components of the ag-
gregate demand, has completely different effects depending on whether one
uses neoclassical supply-driven models or keynesian demand-driven models.
In particular, the different vision about the functioning of the economy is
reflected in the disagreement concerning the implementation of austerity
policies to face the current double problem of high public debts and low
economic growth.
It is well known that neoclassical models predict very low fiscal multi-
pliers, which are not consistent with the empirical evidence.1 This result
is due to the fact that in neoclassical models an increase in public ex-
penditures determines a strong crowding-out effect on consumption and
investments, and only a small positive effect on GDP through the increase
in the labor supplied by households. In contrast, DSGE models are able
to produce fiscal multipliers consistent with the empirical evidence thanks
to two key assumptions, namely that the markup ratio is counter-cyclical
and that the labor supply elasticity is sufficiently high (Hall, 2009). The
first assumption has been criticized by Hall (2009) since it is not supported
by empirical analysis.2 Concerning the second assumption, there exists a
1Empirical studies show that the fiscal multiplier ranges from 0.5 to 1 (see, e.g., Hall,
2009).
2However, Woodford (2011) states that DSGE models are able to produce high fis-
cal multipliers without assuming that the markup ratio is counter-cyclical. He shows
that the multiplier is equal to one if the central bank is able to keep the real interest
rate constant. In addition, he shows that if the monetary policy is constrained by the
zero level of the nominal interest rate, than DSGE models produce much higher fiscal
multipliers.
3
strong controversy between micro and macro labor supply elasticities.3
In a series of recent papers, Farmer (2010; Farmer (2012; 2013a; 2013b)
and Farmer and Plotnikov (2012) use a model with search and match-
ing frictions in the labor market in order to provide a new foundation to
keynesian economics. In these works, Farmer argues that the Keynes’s
General Theory has nothing to do with sticky prices and unemployment is
a potentially permanent feature of a market economy in the long run. In
particular, the aim of Farmer is to build a model which integrates two key
ideas from Keynes’ General Theory: (i) there exists a continuum of labor
market equilibria and a continuum of steady-state unemployment rates,
and (ii) animal spirits select an equilibrium. In order to model animal spir-
its, Farmer introduces, instead of a traditional wage bargaining equation,
a so called belief function which is a forecasting rule used by agents to pre-
dict the future value of the financial assets. In his model, Farmer assumes
that firms produce as many goods as are demanded and hire the number of
workers that is necessary to produce the quantity demanded. The demand,
in turn, depends on beliefs of market participants about the future value
of assets. The economic outcomes are then determined by self-fulfilling be-
liefs. Farmer shows that an exogenous and permanent drop in confidence
shifts the economy from full employment to a new equilibrium character-
ized by high unemployment. This is coherent with the observation that
during major recessions there exists a strong negative correlation between
the value of the stock market and the unemployment rate. Farmer also
asserts that his model provides a much better fit to data than the canon-
ical DSGE model given its ability to explain persistent unemployment as
a demand-driven phenomenon, while in DSGE models the unemployment
rate has to return to its natural level.
The aim of this paper is to propose an extension of the standard Solow
model (Solow, 1956) which (i) takes into account the keynesian involuntary
unemployment, i.e. the unemployment that is explained by the weakness
in aggregate demand and (ii) permits to generate fiscal multipliers con-
3Micro elasticities, computed using individual data, are much smaller than macro
elasticities, based on time series data. Kean and Rogerson (2012) present an attempt
to reconcile the micro and macro controversy. In particular, they show that taking into
account the presence of human capital accumulation and the extensive margin allows to
achieve this reconciliation.
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sistent with the empirical evidence without being obliged to use a high
labor supply elasticity. In our paper, we agree with some ideas proposed
by Roger Farmer. First, animal spirits represent a fundamental element
affecting aggregate demand, GDP and employment. Second, keynesian in-
voluntary unemployment may prevail in the short and in the long run,
even if prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible. This implies
that (i) unemployment has to be considered not only as a short-term phe-
nomenon affecting fluctuations, but also as a long-term issue and (ii) in
order to introduce keynesian unemployment it is not necessary to assume
wage rigidity. Even if, according to the keynesian view, flexible money
wages has destabilizing effects in the economy,4 it is clearly wrong to argue
that keynesian unemployment is caused by wage rigidity. In fact, if the
cause of unemployment is wage rigidity, then full employment would be
easily achieved by reducing the wage level. But this is exactly the con-
trary of the keynesian view because a reduction in the wage level reduces
households’ income, contracts consumption, and has a negative effect on
the real activity and on employment. Of course, wage rigidity is one of
the causes of unemployment but, in the keynesian view, the key element
explaining unemployment is the weakness in aggregate demand and not the
wage rigidity.
In our paper, the main difference with respect to the theory proposed by
Farmer is that we do not model the labor market with search and matching
frictions. Even if we agree that frictions in the labor market, as well as wage
rigidities, play an important role in explaining involuntary unemployment,
the keynesian involuntary unemployment is provoked by the lack of aggre-
gate demand and, therefore, occurs even in the absence of frictions in the
labor market. The main contribution of this paper is thus the introduction
of the keynesian explanation of involuntary unemployment in a neoclassical
framework, without considering wage rigidities and labor market frictions.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
characteristics of the labor market and of the instantaneous equilibrium
4Keynes observed that a policy of flexible money wages “would be to cause a great
instability of prices, so violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in an
economic society functioning after the manner of that in which we live. To suppose that
a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is
one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth” (Keynes, 1936, p. 269).
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in the presence of keynesian involuntary unemployment. In Section 3, we
present our base model which extends the Solow model to endogenize the
unemployment rate. We consider the Solow model because it is a simple
neoclassical growth model where the labor supply is exogenous or, equiv-
alently, the labor supply elasticity is assumed to be equal to zero. To en-
dogenize the unemployment rate we relax the hypothesis that investments
are determined by aggregate savings to achieve full employment. The only
difference with respect to the standard Solow model is that we introduce
one additional equation, i.e., the investment function, and one additional
variable, i.e., the unemployment rate. In our base model we use a very sim-
ple investment function in which investments are assumed to be exogenous
and depend on a parameter reflecting keynesian investors’ animal spirits.
We show that the instantaneous equilibrium may be characterized by the
presence of involuntary unemployment if the parameter that measures an-
imal spirits is lower than a threshold value. In addition, given that in our
model we assume that unemployment is entirely explained by the weakness
in aggregate demand, a reduction in the level of wages, for example through
the negotiation of wages between firms and potential workers, is completely
useless in reducing unemployment. We also show that an under-capitalized
economy converges toward its steady-state equilibrium which may be char-
acterized by a positive value of the unemployment rate. Then, we show that
an increase in the saving rate has a negative effect on employment and GDP,
both in the short and the long run. This result is due to the fact that our
base model, although it presents many features of neoclassical models (i.e.,
the production function allows for factor substitutability, the representative
firm maximizes its profit, factors are remunerated at their marginal produc-
tivity, and prices are perfectly flexible), in reality it works as a keynesian
model, i.e., it is demand driven. Thus, in the base model, an increase in the
saving rate provokes a reduction in private consumption and in aggregate
demand, and thus, increases unemployment. In Section 4, we modify the
investment function in a way which allows us to take into account the fact
that a change in one of the components of the aggregate demand provokes
a crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments. In particular, we intro-
duce a parameter measuring the degree of the crowding-in/crowding-out
effect and we show that (i) if this parameter is equal to zero, the model
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coincides with our base model, i.e. the keynesian demand-driven model;
(ii) if the parameter is equal to one, the model coincides with the standard
Solow model; (iii) if the parameter lies between zero and one, the model
becomes an intermediate model between a keynesian demand-driven model
and a neoclassical supply-driven model. In this case, a shock or a policy
that increases aggregate demand (e.g., a reduction in the saving rate or
the implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy) stimulates GDP and
reduces unemployment (while, in neoclassical models with exogenous la-
bor supply, the short-run effect is nil), but, at the same time, produces a
(partial) crowding-out effect on investments (that is not taken into account
in keynesian models with exogenous investments). Next, we analyze the
effect of the introduction of an expansionary fiscal policy in our base model
in Section 5 and in a model in which the investment function takes into
account the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments in Section 6.
In Section 7, we present numerical simulations which illustrate (i) the ef-
fect of an increase in the saving rate, and (ii) the effect of the introduction
of public expenditures. These simulations, which are run with different
values of the parameter measuring the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on
investments, show that the results are highly dependent on the value of
this parameter. In Section 8, we present econometric estimations of the
parameter measuring the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments
for six OECD countries. We find that the key parameter of our model lies
between 0.6 and 0.8 implying that the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on
investments is quite important and, as we show in Section 9, the size of the
fiscal multiplier is between 1 and 2, which is quite consistent with the em-
pirical evidence. Conclusions and possible extensions to other neoclassical
growth models are discussed in Section 10.
2 The instantaneous equilibrium and the la-
bor market
In the standard Solow model, the representative firm demands the optimal
quantity of labor and capital in order to maximize its profit given a techno-
logical constraint. At the optimum, the marginal productivity of each factor
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coincides with their real cost. Price flexibility permits to equilibrate factor
demands and factor supplies. The remuneration of production factors is
then determined such that the production factors available in the economy
are fully employed by the representative firm. Thus, at each period, to-
tal production is fixed at the level corresponding to the full employment
of the production factors. This implies that, at each period, the sum of
the components of the aggregate demand is also fixed at a predetermined
level. In particular, in the Solow model, which considers a closed economy
without the government, consumption is determined by a fraction of the
real (full employment) GDP, while investments, which are not determined
by the optimal decision of the representative firm, are obtained residually.
This implies that in the Solow model the macroeconomic equilibrium con-
dition, which states that investments equal aggregate savings, determines
the level of investments, i.e. investments are savings-driven. Consequently,
the key hypothesis of the Solow model is that investments adjust in order
to guarantee the full employment of the production factors. In contrast, in
a keynesian model, instead, each component of the aggregate demand is de-
termined by a specific equation, implying that the sum of the components
of the aggregate demand determines real GDP. In particular, if investments
are lower than a threshold level (for example, because of the investors’ pes-
simism), then full employment cannot be achieved and unemployment, due
to the weakness in aggregate demand, appears. Consequently, in a keyne-
sian model, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition between investments
and aggregate savings determines the level of real GDP. In other words,
the introduction of a macroeconomic investment function, which is not di-
rectly related to the optimal behavior of the representative firm, implies
that the competitive equilibrium may be characterized by the presence of
unemployment.
Consider now the labor market. Patinkin (1965) asserted that “key-
nesian economics is the economics of unemployment disequilibrium” (pp.
337-338) because the presence of involuntary unemployment implies that
the labor market is not cleared. Using a a general disequilibrium framework,
Patinkin (1965) and Barro and Grossman (1971) show that a reduction in
aggregate demand reduces labor demand which becomes lower than the
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full-employment level.5
Our interpretation of the functioning of the labor market, which is de-
picted in Figure 2, is different from that of Patinkin (1965) and Barro and
Grossman (1971). In particular, our model is not a model of disequilib-
rium. Instead, our model can be defined as a model of under-employment
equilibrium. The functioning of the labor market is depicted in Figure 2.
First, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition between investments and
aggregate savings determines the unemployment rate (uB in Figure 2). In
particular, this unemployment rate can be interpreted as the equilibrium
unemployment rate6 in the sense that it is the only level that guarantees the
macroeconomic equilibrium between investments and aggregate savings or,
equivalently, the equilibrium in the market of goods. Second, once the un-
employment rate is determined and assuming that the labor supply elastic-
ity is equal to zero as in the Solow model, it is possible to plot the (vertical)
curve representing the total quantity of labor supplied, L · (1− uB). Next,
the profit-maximization condition determines the labor demand function,
Ld = f
(
w
p
)
, as in standard neoclassical models. Next, the intersection
between the labor demand curve and the vertical curve representing the
total quantity of labor supplied (point B in Figure 2) determines the quan-
tity of labor employed, LdB = L · (1− uB), and the “equilibrium” wage rate(
w
p
)
B
. Finally, the production function determines the level of production
depending on the quantity of labor employed, YB = F (L
d
B, K).
7
5Barro and Grossman (1971) assumed that the reduction in aggregate demand is
due to a high price level while, as have we have already said, keynesian theory states
that unemployment is not caused by price rigidity. In addition, in their analysis, the
quantity of labor demanded does not belong to the marginal labor productivity curve.
This off-demand-curve analysis proposed by Patinkin (1965) and Barro and Grossman
(1971) implies that, if labor demand is lower than the full-employment level, the real
wage is lower than the marginal labor productivity, which is inconsistent with the firm’s
profit maximization. Interestingly, even Keynes asserted that in a competitive economy
the real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor (Keynes, 1936, pp. 5 and 17).
6It is important to highlight that the concept of equilibrium unemployment rate
used in our paper is completely different with respect to the concept used in search and
matching models in which the equilibrium unemployment rate is the rate such that the
number of people finding a job is equal to the number of people who lose a job.
7The functioning of the labor market that we have described is essentially equivalent
to that discussed by Davidson (1967 and 1983). According to Davidson, the aggre-
gate demand determines the level of production which in turn determines the level of
employment, while the marginal productivity of labor determines the level of the real
wage. However, we think that the fact that the wage rate is determined by the level
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It is very important to note that point A in Figure 2, i.e. the intersection
between the labor demand and the labor supply curves, does not represent
an equilibrium in the case where the aggregate demand (and thus, the
production level) is equal to YB < Y , i.e. lower than the full-employment
level. In fact, at point A, investments are lower than aggregate savings or,
equivalently, the production level is greater than aggregate demand.
Thus, point B in Figure 2 represents the instantaneous equilibrium of
the economy in the case in which the aggregate demand (and thus, the
production level) is equal to YB < Y . This equilibrium can be defined
as an under-employment equilibrium, in the sense that the weakness in
aggregate demand provokes involuntary unemployment. Nevertheless, it is
an equilibrium: the market of goods and services is in equilibrium because
the production is equal to the aggregate demand, and the labor market is
in equilibrium because the demand of labor is equal to the total quantity
supplied (that is equal to (1− u) multiplied by the active population L).
Our interpretation of the functioning of the labor market implies that,
in order to take into account the keynesian involuntary unemployment, it is
not necessary to introduce nominal nor real rigidities, in prices or in wages
or in both. For this reason, we assume, as in the Solow model, that all the
prices are perfectly flexible. Therefore, money is completely neutral and
can be omitted from the analysis, and the good produced in the economy
can be chosen as the nume´raire.
of the marginal productivity of labor is not completely satisfactory to explain the func-
tioning of the labor market. In fact, the equality between the marginal productivity
of labor and the real wage indicates that, in order to maximize profits, the quantity of
labor demanded by firms must be such that the marginal productivity of labor coincides
with the real wage. Thus, this equality cannot determine the real wage. In addition, if
the quantity of labor demanded is already determined by the inverse of the production
function (because employment represents the quantity of labor necessary to produce the
quantity of goods demanded), then firms have nothing to maximize, implying that the
first order condition for profit maximization is useless.
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3 The base model
3.1 The instantaneous equilibrium
In this section, we present our base model which extends the standard
Solow model by introducing keynesian involuntary unemployment. On the
one hand, our base model is a neoclassical model in the sense that the pro-
duction function allows for factor substitutability, the representative firm
maximizes its profit, factors are remunerated at their marginal produc-
tivity, and all prices are perfectly flexible.8 On the other hand, our base
model works as a keynesian model. Even if the money market is not taken
into account, our model is demand-driven implying that the weakness in
aggregate demand provokes unemployment.
As in the Solow model, the production function is a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with labor-augmenting productivity:
Y (t) =
[
Kd(t)
]α · [A(t) · Ld(t)]1−α (1)
where Kd(t) and Ld(t) represent respectively the demand of capital and
labor, while A(t) represents the productivity level assumed to grow at a
constant rate gA.
The optimal level of factor demand is determined by the following con-
ditions for profit maximization:
r(t) + δ =
∂Y (t)
∂Kd(t)
(2)
w(t) =
∂Y (t)
∂Ld(t)
(3)
Factor prices [r(t)+δ and w(t)] are determined to equilibrate the factor
8Given that prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible, money is completely neutral.
Thus, it is useless to introduce in our model the keynesian LM curve MP =
Md
P (r, Y ).
This equation would determine the price level implying that a change in money supply
M provokes a proportional change in all nominal prices, and thus, no real effects because
all relative prices remain unchanged.
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markets:
Kd(t) = K(t) (4)
Ld(t) = L(t) · [1− u(t)] (5)
where K(t) represents the level of capital supplied by the representative
household, L(t) represents the working-age population assumed to grow
at a constant rate n, and u(t) represents the unemployment rate. Then,
L(t) · [1− u(t)] represents the number of workers.
It is important to note that, regardless of the model used, the number
of workers (that enters the production function) depends on the size of the
working-age population L(t), on the activity rate l(t), and on the unem-
ployment rate u(t) : L(t) · l(t) · [1−u(t)]. In the standard Solow model with
exogenous labor supply, the term l(t) · [1−u(t)] is implicitly exogenous and
constant, and thus, it does not appear in the analytical resolution. Thus,
the Solow model can be interpreted as a model with exogenous and constant
unemployment while, in our model, the unemployment rate is endogenous.
Concerning the activity rate, both in the standard Solow model and in
our model, it is exogenously fixed to one (implying that the labor supply
elasticity is equal to zero) and is omitted from the analytical resolution.
Considering the equilibrium in the factor markets (Equations 4 and 5),
the production function may be rewritten as follows:
Y (t) = K(t)α · [A(t) · L(t) · [1− u(t)]]1−α (6)
where A(t) · L(t) · [1 − u(t)]) represents the number of units of effective
labor. The initial levels of productivity and of the working-age population
are normalized to 1, thus: A(t) = egAt and L(t) = ent. Finally, we define
A(t) · L(t) as the number of potential units of effective labor, in the sense
that this variable represents the number of units of effective labor in the
case full employment, u(t) = 0.
Before proceeding to the resolution of the model, it is important to
present the notation used:
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- The capital per potential unit of effective labor is defined as:
k̂(t) =
K(t)
A(t) · L(t) (7)
- The capital per unit of effective labor is defined as:
k˜(t) =
K(t)
A(t) · L(t) · [1− u(t)] =
k̂(t)
1− u(t)
- Real GDP is then given by:
Y (t) = A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · [1− u(t)]1−α (8)
- Real GDP per potential unit of effective labor is given by:
ŷ(t) =
Y (t)
A(t) · L(t) = k̂(t)
α · [1− u(t)]1−α (9)
The macroeconomic equilibrium condition states that investments are
equal to aggregate savings. In the case of a closed economy without govern-
ment and if, as assumed in the standard Solow model, the representative
agent saves an exogenous and constant fraction s of his revenue Y (t), the
macroeconomic equilibrium condition is:
I(t) = S(t) = s · Y (t)
The key assumption of our model is that investments are not deter-
mined by the macroeconomic equilibrium condition, i.e. investments are
not savings-driven, but they are determined by a specific equation as in the
keynesian model. In our base model, we introduce a simple macroeconomic
investment function as follows:9
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t (10)
9In Appendix 1, we present a more general model in which investments also depend
on the level of the interest rate r. More precisely, we use I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t · (r(t) + δ)−θ
with θ > 0. Here we use a more simple expression because in most of the models
presented in our paper it is possible to find an explicit solution only by fixing θ = 0.
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Concerning the investment function used in our base model, it is first
important to note that investments are not microfounded. However, even
in the standard Solow model and in other neoclassical models where the
representative firm chooses at each period the optimal demand of capital to
maximize its profits (see Equation 2), investments are not microfounded.
The difference between the standard Solow model and our model is that
in the Solow model investments are determined by the level of aggregate
savings while, in our model, investments are determined by an independent
investment function. Second, Equation 10 implies, as in the Samuelson’s
keynesian cross diagram, that investments are exogenous. In particular,
investments are assumed to depend on a positive parameter γ which may
be interpreted as a parameter reflecting keynesian investors’ animal spirits.
Using Equation 10, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition becomes:
s · k̂(t)α · A(t) · L(t) · [1− u(t)]1−α = γ · e(n+gA)t
Solving the previous equation, we get:
1− u(t) =
(γ
s
) 1
1−α · k̂(t)− α1−α (11)
Equation 11 determines the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment
rate which represents the only value that guarantees the equilibrium be-
tween investments and aggregate savings, and thus, the equilibrium be-
tween the aggregate supply Y (t) and the aggregate demand C(t) + I(t).
First of all, Equation 11 shows how investors’ animal spirits affect the in-
stantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate because it negatively depends
on the value of γ. In particular, if γ = s · k̂(t)α, the instantaneous un-
employment rate is equal to zero. In fact, considering Equations 10 and
7, γ = s · k̂(t)α implies that I(t) = s · K(t)α · [A(t) · L(t))]1−α, i.e. in-
vestments are equal to aggregate savings in a full-employment economy, as
assumed in the Solow model. This means that if the parameter γ is allowed
to vary over time, our base model is able to exactly mimic the standard
Solow model. In contrast, if γ < s · k̂(t)α, then the unemployment rate is
positive. This means that if γ is lower than the value necessary to achieve
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full employment, the economy is in a situation of under-employment equi-
librium due to the weakness in aggregate demand and, in particular, in
investments. Moreover, fluctuations in the confidence of investors affect
the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate.
Equation 11 also implies (i) ∂u(t)
∂s
> 0, and (ii) ∂u(t)
∂k̂(t)
> 0. In particular,
(i) a reduction in the saving rate induces an increase in consumption and
then in aggregate demand, which permits a reduction in the equilibrium
unemployment rate. (ii) An increase in the capital per potential unit of
effective increases the level of savings per potential unit of effective labor
and, given that investments are exogenous, the unemployment rate has
to increase in order to guarantee the macroeconomic equilibrium between
investments and aggregate savings.
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that a reduction in the level of wages
is completely useless in order to reduce unemployment. This is because,
in our model, unemployment is provoked by the weakness in aggregate
demand and, in particular, in investments. In fact, if γ < s · k̂(t)α and if
the real wage is determined in order to achieve full employment (i.e. point
A in Figure 2), then private savings s ·K(t)α · [A(t) · L(t))]1−α are greater
than investments γ · e(n+gA)t, and, consequently, production is greater than
aggregate demand, implying that the economy is not in equilibrium.
3.2 The steady state and the transition towards the
long-run equilibrium
The evolution of the capital per potential unit of effective labor is given by:
˙̂
k(t) =
d
(
K(t)
A(t)·L(t)
)
dt
=
K˙(t) · A(t) · L(t)−K(t) · (A˙(t) · L(t) + A(t) · L˙(t))
[A(t) · L(t)]2
Given that the aggregate capital stock evolves according to K˙(t) =
I(t)− δ ·K(t), we find that :
˙̂
k(t) = s · ŷ(t)− (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t)
Combining the previous equation with Equations 9 and 11, we find that
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the dynamics of the capital per potential unit of effective labor is described
by:
˙̂
k(t) = γ − (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t) (12)
The steady-state condition
˙̂
k(t) = 0 allows us to determine the station-
ary value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor:
k̂∗ =
γ
n+ gA + δ
(13)
Combining the previous equation with Equation 11, we determine the
stationary value of the unemployment rate as:
1− u∗ = γ · (n+ gA + δ)
α
1−α
s
1
1−α
(14)
The previous equations imply that a permanent increase in the param-
eter γ which reflects investors’ animal spirits determines (i) an increase in
the long-run value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor and (ii)
a reduction in the long-run value of the unemployment rate. These results
are explained by the fact that an increase in investments permits both a
greater capital accumulation and an increase in aggregate demand.
Consider now an under-capitalized economy, i.e. an economy in which
the initial value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor is lower
than its stationary value, i.e. k̂(0) < k̂∗. Equations 12 and 11 imply
that, during the transition phase, both the capital per potential unit of
effective labor and the unemployment rate increase over time, until the
economy reaches its steady state. In particular, the long-run unemploy-
ment rate is equal to zero, i.e. the economy converges toward the long-run
full-employment equilibrium, only if γ = s
1
1−α
(n+gA+δ)
α
1−α
. In contrast, if γ is
lower than this value, then the economy displays unemployment even in
the long run. Clearly, this result is related to the fact that the parameter
γ, which measures investors’ animal spirits is assumed to be completely ex-
ogenous. Thus, the parameter γ does not converge over time to the value
that guarantees the full employment in the long run.
One interesting aspect is the relationship between the growth rate of
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real wages and the unemployment rate during the transition phase of the
economy towards its steady state equilibrium. Considering that w(t) =
(1− α) ·A(t) ·
[
k̂(t)
1−u(t)
]α
(from Equation 3),
˙̂
k(t)
k̂(t)
= γ
k̂(t)
− (n+ gA + δ) (from
Equation 12) and
˙1−u(t)
1−u(t) = − α1−α ·
˙̂
k(t)
k̂(t)
(from Equation 11), it is possible to
write the growth rate of the real wage as:
w˙(t)
w(t)
= gA +
α
1− α ·
[
γ
k̂(t)
− (n+ gA + δ)
]
Considering again Equation 11 which implies that k̂(t) = [1− u(t)]− α1−α ·(
γ
s
) 1
α , the growth rate of the real wage can be written as:
w˙(t)
w(t)
= gA +
α
1− α ·
 [1− u(t)] α1−α · γ(
γ
s
) 1
α
− (n+ gA + δ)
 (15)
Interestingly, Equation 15 may be interpreted as the Phillips curve. In
fact, it shows that in our model there exists a negative relationship between
the growth rate of the real wage and the unemployment rate. In fact, during
the transition phase towards the long-run equilibrium, the growth rate of
the real wage decreases over time while the unemployment rate increases
over time.
4 Introduction of a crowding-in/crowding-
out effect on investments
Our base model discussed in the previous section implies that an increase
in the saving rate has a negative effect on employment and on real GDP,
both in short and the long run. This result, which is not consistent with the
empirical evidence, is related to the fact that an increase in the saving rate
reduces private consumption and aggregate demand, while investments are
assumed to be unaffected. This assumption is relaxed in this section.
In this section we consider an increase in the saving rate from the initial
value sold to the value snew and we assume, for simplicity, that before the
shock the economy is at the steady state. With respect to what supposed in
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the previous section, we assume here that a change in private consumption
and savings could affect investments. In particular, we modify the macroe-
conomic investment function by adding a term that allows to consider the
crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·∆SH(t) (16)
where β is a parameter lying between 0 and 1 that measures the degree of
the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments, and ∆SH(t) represents
the change in private savings with respect to the pre-shock situation.
To analyze Equation 16, it is important to note that the change in pri-
vate savings can be decomposed in two effects: (i) the effect provoked by
the increase in the saving rate and computed at a given level of the unem-
ployment rate; (ii) the effect provoked by the change in the unemployment
rate and computed using the new value of the saving rate. Thus:
snew · Ynew(t)− sold · Yold(t) =
[
snew · Y (t)− sold · Yold(t)
]
+
[
snew · Ynew(t) − snew · Y (t)
]
where Y (t) represents the post-shock value of GDP computed at a given
level of the unemployment rate, as follows:
Y (t) = A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α (17)
In the investment function (Equation 16), the change in private savings
has to be computed by considering only the first effect, i.e., by neutralizing
the effect provoked by the change in the unemployment rate. Otherwise,
the investment function becomes an identity (if β = 1) or it is never ver-
ified (if β 6= 1). In both cases, the parameter β cannot be identified in
the econometric analysis. Thus, the change in private savings has to be
computed as follows:
∆SH(t) = snew · Y (t)− sold · Yold(t) (18)
Concerning the effect of an increase in the saving rate, it is interesting
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to consider three cases:
1. If β is equal to 1, the increase in private savings computed at a
given level of the unemployment rate produces an identical increase
in investments, implying that the crowding-in effect on investments is
complete. The increase in investments coincides with the first positive
effect on private savings, whereas the second effect is nil which implies
that the unemployment rate is not affected. In fact, the increase in the
saving rate produces a reduction in consumption which is perfectly
compensated by an increase in investments. Thus, the unemployment
rate and real GDP are not affected in the first period. This is exactly
what happens in the standard Solow model or in a neoclassical model
where the elasticity of labor supply is equal to zero, implying that
real GDP is a predetermined variable. Consequently, our model with
β = 1 reproduces the standard Solow model.
2. If β is equal to 0, investments remain unchanged. Thus, the first
positive effect is perfectly compensated by the second effect, i.e., by
the reduction in private savings due to the increase in the unem-
ployment rate. The crowding-in effect on investments is nil. This is
exactly what happens in a keynesian model where investments are
exogenous. In this case, an increase in the saving rate produces a
reduction in consumption and in real GDP, and an increase in the
unemployment rate. Consequently, our model with β = 0 reproduces
a keynesian model with exogenous investments.
3. If 0 < β < 1, the crowding-in effect on investments is partial. As we
will see later, according to the value of β, an increase in the saving
rate provokes (i) an increase in the level of investments (which is
lower with respect to the case of a neoclassical model where the labor
supply elasticity is equal to zero, but higher with respect to the case of
a keynesian model with exogenous investments); and (ii) an increase
in the unemployment rate (which is lower with respect to the case of a
keynesian model with exogenous investments, but higher with respect
to the case of a neoclassical model where the unemployment rate is
exogenous and constant). This allows to build a class of models that
are between the keynesian and the neoclassical models.
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Introducing Equations 17 and 18 in Equation 16, the investment func-
tion becomes:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t (19)
+ β · snew · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
The investment function can also be written as follows:10
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
S(t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− S∗(t)
]
(20)
Equation 20 will be used in Section 8 in order to empirically investigate
the value of the coefficient β.
4.1 Instantaneous equilibrium
Using Equation 19, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition, snew ·Y (t) =
I(t), becomes:
snew · k̂(t)α · e(n+gA)t · [1− u(t)]1−α = γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · snew · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
Equations 13 and 14 imply that (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α = γ/sold. Thus, the
instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
1− u(t) =
[
γ · (1− β) + β · snew · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
snew
] 1
1−α
· k̂(t)− α1−α (21)
Two extreme cases are interesting: the case β = 0 implying that the
crowding-in effect on investments is nil, and the case β = 1 implying that
10Computation details are reported in Appendix 2.
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the crowding-in effect on investments is complete:
1− u(t) =

(
γ
snew
) 1
1−α · k̂(t)− α1−α if β = 0
1− u∗ if β = 1
(22)
Note that the two polar cases reproduce, respectively, the keynesian
model presented in the previous section and the Solow model where the
unemployment rate is exogenous. Consequently, an increase in the saving
rate increases the unemployment rate (except for the case of a complete
crowding-in effect, i.e. β = 1) and the size of the negative effect is a
decreasing function of β.
4.2 The steady state
The evolution of the capital per potential unit of effective labor is given by
˙̂
k(t) = snew · ŷ(t)− (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t). Considering Equations 9 and 21, we
find:
˙̂
k(t) = γ · (1− β) + β · snew · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α − (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t)
The steady-state condition
˙̂
k(t) = 0 allows us to determine the new station-
ary value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor. In particular,
the long-run value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor in the
two polar cases is:
k̂∗∗ =

γ
n+gA+δ
if β = 0(
snew
sold
) 1
1−α · γ
n+gA+δ
if β = 1
(23)
This implies that the capital per potential unit of effective labor is not
affected by an increase in the saving rate when the crowding-in effect is nil,
as in our base model. However, the effect is positive when the crowding-in
effect is complete (as in the Solow model), but also when the crowding-in
effect is partial (i.e. when 0 < β < 1).
By combining Equations 21 and 23, we can determine the new station-
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ary value of the unemployment rate for the two polar cases:
1− u∗∗ =
 (1− u∗) ·
(
sold
snew
) 1
1−α
if β = 0
1− u∗ if β = 1
(24)
An increase in the saving rate increases the steady state unemployment
rate, u∗∗ > u∗, except for the case in which the crowding-in effect is com-
plete, i.e. β = 1.
Concerning the short-run effect on real GDP, for the two polar cases
and assuming that the saving rate increases at t = 0, real GDP is:
Y (0) =
{
γ
snew
· A(0) · L(0) if β = 0
k̂(0)α · (1− u∗)1−α · A(0) · L(0) if β = 1
This result implies that, with the exception of the case β = 1, i.e. the case in
which the crowding-in effect on investments is complete, the short-run effect
is negative because k̂(t) is a predetermined variable and unemployment
increases. In contrast, if β = 1, there is no effect on real GDP in the
short-run, because the unemployment rate is not affected.
In the long run, the GDP level is given by:
Y (t) =

γ
snew
· A(t) · L(t) if β = 0(
snew
n+gA+δ
) α
1−α · (1− u∗) · A(t) · L(t) if β = 1
The long-run effect on GDP of an increase in the saving rate is negative
if β = 0 and positive if β = 1. This implies that there exists a threshold
value β˜ such that if β > β˜ the long-run effect on GDP is positive, while if
β < β˜ the long-run effect is negative.
5 Introduction of public expenditures and
lump-sum taxes
Now we consider again our base model (i.e. the model with the invest-
ment function defined by Equation 10) and we assume that, starting from
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a situation of steady state, the government introduces expenditures G(t).
Public expenditures are assumed to be equal to an exogenous and constant
fraction g of real GDP. This shock is assumed to be permanent and unan-
ticipated. Of course, the government has to introduce taxes such that the
present value of all the taxes equals the present value of all the public ex-
penditures. The easiest way to introduce in our model the taxes in order to
respect the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is to assume
that the government introduces a lump-sum tax such that, at each instant,
T (t) = G(t) = g · Y (t).
5.1 The instantaneous equilibrium
Assuming that private savings are equal to an exogenous fraction s of the
disposable income Y (t) − T (t), and given that public savings are equal to
zero, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition becomes:
I(t) = s · (1− g) · Y (t)
Using the investment function defined in our base model (Equation 10),
we find:
s · (1− g) · k̂(t)α · [1− u(t)]1−α · A(t) · L(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t
Then, the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
1− u(t) =
[
γ
s · (1− g)
] 1
1−α
· k̂(t)− α1−α (25)
The previous expression implies that the equilibrium unemployment
rate depends negatively on the value of g. Thus, given that k̂(t) is a pre-
determined variable, the implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy,
represented by the simultaneous introduction of public expenditures and
lump-sum taxes, allows to reduce the unemployment rate and to stimulate
real GDP in the short term, through the increase in aggregate demand.
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5.2 The steady state
In the presence of public expenditures and lump-sum taxes as previously
described, the evolution of the capital per potential unit of effective labor
is given by
˙̂
k(t) = s · ŷ(t) ·(1−g)−(n+gA+δ) · k̂(t). Considering Equations
9 and 25, we find:
˙̂
k(t) = s · k̂(t)α · γ
s · (1− g) · k̂(t)
−α · (1− g)− (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t)
Thus, the dynamics of the capital per potential unit of effective labor
is described by:
˙̂
k(t) = γ − (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t) (26)
The steady-state condition
˙̂
k(t) = 0 allows us to determine the station-
ary value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor:
k̂∗ =
γ
n+ gA + δ
(27)
Considering Equation 25 and the stationary value of the capital per
potential unit of effective labor (Equation 27), we can determine the sta-
tionary value of the unemployment rate:
1− u∗ = γ · (n+ gA + δ)
α
1−α
[s · (1− g)] 11−α
(28)
The two previous expressions imply that an increase in public expen-
ditures (i) does not affect the steady state value of the capital per poten-
tial unit of effective labor and (ii) allows to reduce the long-term level of
the unemployment rate. This implies that an expansionary fiscal policy
can be adopted in order to restore full employment. In fact, u∗ = 0 if
g = 1 − γ1−α
s
· (n + gA + δ)α. This implies that the lowest is the value of
the parameter γ reflecting investors’ animal spirits, the higher will be the
value of public expenditures (and lump-sum taxes) necessary to restore full
employment.
The long-run effect on real GDP, as the short-run effect previously pre-
sented, is positive. Real GDP is then stimulated when an expansionary
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fiscal policy is introduced, both in the short and the long run. This result
is explained by the fact that the model is demand-driven and by the fact
that the specification of the investment function implies that an increase
in public expenditures produces no crowding-out effect on investments. Of
course, in neoclassical models, the effect is completely different because an
expansionary fiscal policy reduces aggregate savings and investments which
produces a negative effect on capital accumulation and on GDP. The hy-
pothesis that an increase in public expenditures produces no crowding-out
effect on investments is relaxed in the next section.
6 Introduction of public expenditures with
(partial) crowding-out effect on investments
6.1 The instantaneous equilibrium
As in the previous section, we assume that, starting from the steady state,
the government introduces expenditures and a lump-sum tax such that
T (t) = G(t) = g ·Y (t). Now, we modify the investment function as follows:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t + β · [∆SH(t) + ∆SG(t)] (29)
where β is again a parameter between 0 and 1 that measures the degree
of the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments, ∆SH(t) represents
the change in private savings (with respect to the situation before a shock)
computed at a given level of the unemployment rate, and ∆SG(t) repre-
sents the change in public savings with respect to the situation before a
shock. Thus, the investment function defined in Equation 29 allows to
take into account the crowding-out effect provoked by an increase in public
expenditures.
Starting from a situation of steady state, the introduction of public
expenditures (accompanied by the introduction of a lump-sum tax), has no
effect on public savings (∆SG(t) = 0) and produces the following change
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in private savings:
∆SH(t) = s · (1− g) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α · A(t) · L(t)
− s · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α · A(t) · L(t)
As shown in Appendix 3, the investment function can also be written
as follows:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
S(t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− S∗(t)
]
(30)
This equation is identical to Equation 20 and will be used in the econo-
metric analysis.
The macroeconomic equilibrium condition can be written as:
s · (1− g) · k̂(t)α · [1− u(t)]1−α = γ
+ β · s · (1− g) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
− β · s · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
Considering that Equations 13 and 14 imply that (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α =
γ/s, the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
1− u(t) =
[
γ · (1− β) + β · s · (1− g) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
s · (1− g)
] 1
1−α
· k̂(t)− α1−α
(31)
The previous expression implies that the introduction of public expen-
ditures, accompanied by a simultaneous introduction of a lump-sum tax,
permits a reduction in the level of unemployment, except for the case β = 1.
In particular, the unemployment rate in the two polar cases is:
1− u(t) =

[
γ
s·(1−g)
] 1
1−α · k̂(t)− α1−α if β = 0
1− u∗ if β = 1
(32)
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6.2 The steady state
The introduction of public expenditures and lump-sum taxes as previously
described, implies that the evolution of the capital per potential unit of
effective labor is given by
˙̂
k(t) = s · (1 − g) · ŷ(t) − (n + gA + δ) · k̂(t).
Considering Equations 9 and 31, the dynamics of the capital per potential
unit of effective labor is described by:
˙̂
k(t) = γ · (1−β)+β ·s · (1−g) · k̂(t)α · (1−u∗)1−α− (n+gA+ δ) · k̂(t) (33)
The steady-state condition
˙̂
k(t) = 0 allows us to determine the new
stationary value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor in the
two polar cases:
k̂∗∗ =

γ
n+gA+δ
if β = 0[
s·(1−g)
n+gA+δ
] 1
1−α · (1− u∗) if β = 1
(34)
This implies that the capital per potential unit of effective labor is
not affected by an increase in public expenditures when the crowding-in
effect is nil, as in our base model while, with β > 0, an increase in public
expenditures reduces capital accumulation.
Considering again Equation 31 and the stationary value of the capital
per potential unit of effective labor (Equation 34), we can determine the
new stationary value of the unemployment rate for the two polar cases:
1− u∗∗ =

[
γ
s·(1−g)
] 1
1−α ·
(
γ
n+gA+δ
)− α
1−α
if β = 0
1− u∗ if β = 1
(35)
This implies that the expansionary fiscal policy permits a reduction in
the long-term unemployment rate, except for the case β = 1.
7 Numerical simulations
In this section we present numerical simulations in order to analyze the evo-
lution of (i) of an economy in which the saving rate increases and (ii) of an
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economy in which public expenditures and lump-sum taxes are introduced.
We first calibrate our model at the steady state without public expendi-
tures and taxes. Our economy is characterized by a population growth rate
of 0.5%, a productivity growth rate of 1.5%, a saving rate of 20%, and a
depreciation rate of 4%. Moreover, α in the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion is fixed at 1/3 and γ in the investment equation has been calibrated
in order to obtain a stationary unemployment rate equal to 10%.
7.1 Increase in the saving rate
In the first simulation we assume that the economy is at the steady state
and the private saving rate increases from 20% to 21%.
We first solve the model using the Solow model, i.e. by assuming that
investments are determined by aggregate savings instead of by the invest-
ment function defined in Equation 10 and by fixing the unemployment rate
at 10% or, equivalently, by assuming that the number of workers is equal,
at each period, to 90% of the active population. Then, we solve the model
by introducing Equation 10 and by endogenizing the unemployment rate.
Finally, we solve the model by considering different values of β, i.e. different
degrees of the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments.
The economic effects are reported in Figure 3. First, Figure 3a shows
the effect on the unemployment rate. In the case in which β = 0 (which
corresponds to our base model and to the keynesian model with exogenous
investments), i.e. with , the increase in the saving rate determines a strong
increase in the unemployment rate because this shock induces a reduction
in private consumption and in aggregate demand. In particular, the unem-
ployment rate increases to 16.4%. The negative effect on unemployment
is less important if a crowding-in effect on investments is produced. For
example, in the case in which β is equal to 0.2, the unemployment rate
becomes equal to 15.2% in the short run and to 15.5% in the long run. In
addition, a more important value of β implies a lower negative impact on
the unemployment rate. In the case in which β = 1 (which corresponds to
the Solow model), the reduction in private consumption is perfectly com-
pensated by the increase in investments, implying that aggregate demand
is unaffected and the unemployment rate remains equal to 10%, as before
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the shock.
Figure 3b shows the effect on GDP, measured as the percentage devi-
ations with respect to the situation before the shock. The most negative
effect is obtained with β = 0 where the value of GDP is 4.8% lower than
before the shock. The negative effect is less important if β is positive. In-
terestingly, if β is equal to 0.8 and to 0.9, the effect on GDP is negative
in the short run (-1%) and becomes positive after some periods. In the
case in which β is equal to 1, as in the Solow model, there is no effect on
GDP in the short run (because unemployment remains unchanged), while
the long-run effect is positive (+2.5%).
7.2 Introduction of public expenditures and lump-
sum taxes
In the second simulation, we assume that the economy is at the steady
state and the government permanently introduces public expenditures and
lump-sum taxes which represent 2% of GDP in each period.
Figures 4a and 4b show the effect on the unemployment rate and on
GDP, respectively. With β = 0, the introduction of the expansionary fiscal
policy reduces the unemployment rate from 10% to 7.2% and stimulates
GDP (+2%), both in the short and in the long run. In the Solow model
and in our model with β = 1, the unemployment remains unchanged, while
the GDP is negatively affected in the long run (-1%). Interestingly, if β
is equal to 0.8 and to 0.9, the effect on GDP is positive in the short run
(thanks to the reduction in the unemployment rate), but becomes negative
after some periods due to the unfavorable evolution of capital accumulation.
8 Econometric analysis
Both the theoretical analysis and the numerical simulations have shown
that the key element of our model is the parameter β which measures
the degree of the crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments. In this
section we present a first attempt to estimate this parameter. In particular,
using OECD yearly data from 1955 to 2012, we estimate the investment
function defined in Equation 20 for six OECD countries: France, Germany,
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Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States. For each of the six countries
we separately estimate the following equation:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
S(t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− S∗(t)
]
+ (t) (36)
where γ and β are the parameters to be estimated.
We then use two variables to explain the level of investments. The
first one may be interpreted as a trend component. In particular, for each
country, we approximate the term n + gA by the average growth rate of
investments during the period. The second variable may be interpreted
as a cyclical component which is related to the crowding-in/crowding-out
effect produced by a change in aggregate savings with respect to the pre-
shock situation. In order to construct this second variable it is necessary
to define the initial steady state value of the unemployment rate and the
evolution of aggregate savings in the pre-shock situation. In our regressions,
we consider three values for u∗ (5%, 6% and 7%) and we compute the value
of aggregate savings in the pre-shock situation using a HP filter with the
smoothing parameter fixed at 6.25 (see Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).
The econometric results, reported in Table 1, provide a strong evidence
that the parameter β is positive and lower than one, implying the existence
of a partial crowding-in/crowding-out mechanism on investments. In par-
ticular, for Germany, Italy and the UK the estimated parameter is close to
0.7 and it is robust to changes in the steady state value of the unemploy-
ment rate used. The estimated parameter is higher for the USA (around
0.9) and lower for France and Japan, even if the parameter is quite sensitive
to changes in the steady state value of the unemployment rate used.
9 Fiscal multiplier
In this section, we compute the value of the fiscal multiplier using the
econometric results presented in the previous section. We assume that
the government introduces public expenditures at time t = 0 for just one
period, without introducing taxes.11
11Note that at time t = 0, we have A(t) · L(t) = 1 and e(n+gA)t = 1.
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The investment function is given by Equation 29 where the change in
public savings at time t = 0 is ∆SG(0) = −G(0), while the change in
private savings (computed at a given level of the unemployment rate) is:
∆SH(0) = s · k̂(0)α · (1− u∗)1−α − s · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α = 0
because the capital stock is a predetermined variable.
Then, the macroeconomic equilibrium condition at time t = 0 can be
written as:
s · k̂(0)α · (1− u(0))1−α −G(0) = γ − β ·G(0)
Thus, the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate at time t = 0
is given by:
1− u(0) =
[
γ + (1− β) ·G(0)
s
] 1
1−α
· k̂(0)− α1−α
Hence, an increase in public expenditures at time t = 0 reduces the
short-run level of the unemployment rate, except for the case β = 1.
Real GDP at time t = 0 is given by:
Y (0) =
γ
s
+
1− β
s
·G(0) (37)
Equation 37 implies that the fiscal multiplier is equal to 1−β
s
and lies
between 0 (if β = 1 as in neoclassical models with elasticity of labor supply
equal to zero) and 1/s (if β = 0 as in keynesian models with exogenous
investments). Considering a saving rate s equal to 20% and a value of β
ranging between 0.6 and 0.8 according to the econometric estimations pre-
sented in the previous section, our model predicts that the fiscal multiplier
lies between 1 and 2. In particular, in the case of β = 0.7, which is the case
of Germany, Italy and the UK, the implied fiscal multiplier is equal to 1.5.
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10 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to extend the standard Solow model in a way that
allows to endogenize unemployment provoked by the weakness in aggregate
demand. The introduction of keynesian unemployment in the Solow model
is made it possible by relaxing the hypothesis, used in the classical and
neoclassical theory, of full-utilization of the production factors.
With respect to the standard Solow model, our base model presents one
additional equation (a simple investment function in which investments are
driven by investors’ animal spirits) and one additional variable (the unem-
ployment rate). We show that both the instantaneous and the steady-state
equilibria may be under-employment equilibria, implying that involuntary
unemployment occurs because of the weakness in aggregate demand pro-
voked by the low level of investors’ confidence.
We analyze the effects of a change in the saving rate and in the value
of public expenditures. Using our base model, that works as a keyne-
sian demand-driven model, we find that an increase in aggregate demand
(due to a reduction in the saving rate or to an increase in public expendi-
tures), reduces unemployment and stimulates real GDP. Then, we modify
the investment function in a way that allows us to take into account the
crowding-in/crowding-out effect on investments. In particular, we intro-
duce a parameter β that measures the degree of the crowding-in/crowding-
out effect. We show that if β is equal to zero, the model coincides with our
base model, i.e. the keynesian demand-driven model with exogenous invest-
ments; if β is equal to one, the model coincides with the Solow model and
the unemployment rate remains unchanged; if β is between zero and one,
the model is an intermediate model. In this case, a shock that increases the
aggregate demand stimulates real GDP and reduces unemployment (while
in neoclassical models where the elasticity of labor supply is equal to zero
the real effect is nil), but also produces a (partial) crowding-out effect on
investments (that is not taken into account in keynesian models with ex-
ogenous investments). Simulation results show that the effect of a policy
or a shock on real GDP may be positive or negative according to the value
of β which indicates how much a change in private and public savings af-
fects investments. Estimations on six OECD countries reveal that β lies
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between 0.6 and 0.8, implying that the crowding-out effect on investments
is quite important, but not complete as assumed in neoclassical models.
These estimation results imply that the fiscal multiplier is between 1 and
2, which is quite consistent with the empirical evidence.
Finally, in the present paper we introduced keynesian involuntary un-
employment in the Solow model which is the simplest neoclassical model.
However, involuntary unemployment can be introduced in other neoclassi-
cal models. Possible extensions of the model presented in this paper are
the introduction of keynesian unemployment in models with infinitely-lived
households (as the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model) and in models where
households have a finite horizon (as the Diamond model), i.e. models where
households have to decide the optimal path of consumption. The interest-
ing point is that the optimal level of consumption is chosen by households
without considering that, at the aggregate level, consumption affects the
aggregate demand. This implies that these possible extensions would per-
mit to take into account that keynesian involuntary unemployment may
appear not only because of the weakness in the level of investments, but
also because of the weakness in the level of consumption if, for instance,
the real interest rate is sufficiently high or the rate of time preference is
sufficiently low.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate in six OECD countries
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Figure 2: Involuntary unemployment in the labor market
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Figure 3: Economic impacts of an increase in the saving rate
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Figure 4: Economic impacts of the introduction of public expenditures
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Table 1: Estimation of the investment function for six OECD countries
5% 6% 7%
γ 51 361 51 646 51 859
France β 0.594 0.492 0.386
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78
γ 223 330 224 642 225 948
Germany β 0.744 0.740 0.736
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82
γ 128 562 129 291 129 996
Italy β 0.691 0.677 0.661
R2 0.79 0.79 0.79
γ 52 672 731 52 821 434 52 883 964
Japan β 0.685 0.574 0.458
R2 0.49 0.48 0.48
γ 63 606 63 913 64 214
UK β 0.726 0.718 0.710
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82
γ 503 740 506 660 509 324
USA β 0.962 0.918 0.873
R2 0.90 0.90 0.90
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Appendix 1. Base model with a general investment function
Here we solve our base model by considering a more general invest-
ment function where investments negatively depend on the gross rate of
remuneration of capital as follows:
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t · (r(t) + δ)−θ (38)
where γ and θ are positive parameters.
Considering that r(t)+δ = α · [1−u(t)]1−α · k̂(t)α−1, the macroeconomic
equilibrium between investments and aggregate savings is given by:
s · k̂(t)α ·A(t) ·L(t) · [1−u(t)]1−α = γ ·e(n+gA)t ·
[
α · [1− u(t)]1−α · k̂(t)α−1
]−θ
Then, the instantaneous equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
1− u(t) =
( γ
s · αθ
) 1
(1+θ)(1−α) · k̂(t) θ(1−α)−α(1+θ)(1−α) (39)
Equation 39 implies that ∂u(t)
∂γ
< 0, ∂u(t)
∂s
> 0, and ∂u(t)
∂k̂(t)
> 0 with θ < α
1−α .
Given that
˙̂
k(t) = s · ŷ(t)− (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t), ŷ(t) = Y (t)A(t)·L(t) = k̂(t)α ·
[1−u(t)]1−α and considering Equation 39, we find that the dynamics of the
capital per potential unit of effective labor is described by:
˙̂
k(t) =
s
θ
1+θ · γ 11+θ
α
θ
1+θ
· k̂(t) θ1+θ − (n+ gA + δ) · k̂(t)
The steady-state condition
˙̂
k(t) = 0 allows us to determine the station-
ary value of the capital per potential unit of effective labor:
k̂∗ =
sθ · γ
αθ · (n+ gA + δ)1+θ (40)
Considering again Equation 39 and the stationary value of the capital
per potential unit of effective labor, we can determine the stationary value
of the unemployment rate u∗:
1− u∗ = γ
s · αθ ·
(
s
n+ gA + δ
)θ− α
1−α
(41)
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Appendix 2. Demonstration of Equation 20
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · snew · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
= γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · snew · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α · [1− u(t)]
1−α
[1− u(t)]1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
= γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · snew · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · [1− u(t)]1−α · (1− u
∗)1−α
[1− u(t)]1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
= γ · e(n+gA)t + β · snew · Y (t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− β · sold · Yold
= γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
snew · Y (t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− sold · Yold
]
= γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
S(t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− S∗(t)
]
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Appendix 3. Demonstration of Equation 30
I(t) = γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · s · (1− g) · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α
− β · s · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
= γ · e(n+gA)t
+ β · s · (1− g) · A(t) · L(t) · k̂(t)α · (1− u∗)1−α · [1− u(t)]
1−α
[1− u(t)]1−α
− β · sold · A(t) · L(t) · (k̂∗)α · (1− u∗)1−α
= γ · e(n+gA)t + β · s · (1− g) · Y (t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− β · s · Yold
= γ · e(n+gA)t + β ·
[
S(t) ·
(
1− u∗
1− u(t)
)1−α
− S∗(t)
]
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